Misleading invoice fraud targeting the owners of intellectual property rights

Crime situation in 2021

Analysis Project APATE
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This Europol product is descriptive and oriented towards explaining the current crime situation providing an overview of all relevant factors (OCGs, criminal markets, and geographical dimension).
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Strategic guidance for the major stakeholders in the fight against scams, including concrete recommended actions

Legislators (EU & MS levels)

IP offices (EU & MS levels)

Law Enforcement Authorities

Business/User Associations/lawyers/professional representatives

Banks/Anti-money laundering regulated institutions

Annex 1: List of abbreviations
1 Key findings

The misleading invoice scam, in the area of intellectual property rights (IPR) is an old-fashioned but still very lucrative crime. Taking advantage of the by-design transparency of related data, this scam deceives IPRs rights owners, a minimum of a third of a million a year, during the trade mark, patent or design registration process, wherever they are located.

IPR owners are being targeted by Legal Business Structures offering unnecessary or fake services, such as registration for a private register or alleged IP watch services which subsequently aren’t actually done. Some rogue Legal Business Structures, also lure victims by requesting additional fees and presenting them as part of the normal IP registration process or offering fake IPR renewal services that directly affect the protection of the IP. Several rogue actors are also currently expanding their scheme to domain name registration.

To achieve their goal, the Legal Business Structures mimic the activities of the official IP offices, using names and logos that look and/or sound like genuine offices. These fraudsters often succeed in staying under the judicial authority’s radar when defrauding their victims of hundreds or thousands of euros, knowing that these ‘small’ fees would be difficult to identify or too expensive to investigate on a local or regional level.

The yearly turnover could be estimated to be millions of euros per attacker, enabling them to build or rely upon a trustworthy supply chain of printing or shipping Legal Business Structures and money laundering mechanisms. Added to the cost affecting the IPR owners is the loss of trust that genuine IP offices and IP professionals/lawyers may face, as a result of criminal schemes which can affect the protection of IP itself.

In cooperation with the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), the Anti-Scam Network and the European Law Enforcement Authorities (LEAs), Europol is supporting the initiatives and investigations of Member States and third parties in tackling this scheme. Stakeholders still have a lot to do, such as reinforcing the EU level and/or the national legal framework, strengthening the implementation of the Know Your Customer (KYC)\(^1\) procedure, developing prevention campaigns and improving centralised data collection at a national level to give this scheme the necessary attention to make Europe safer.

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1 The Know Your Customer or Know Your Client guidelines in financial services require professionals to make an effort to verify the identity, suitability, and risks involved in maintaining a business relationship.
2 Introduction

Aim of the report

The aim of the report is to enhance awareness amongst the EU Member States (MS) and participating stakeholders on the topic of acquisition fraud connected with the national, European and international IPR registration processes and to provide an assessment of the dynamics of the scam.

This report further intends to provide an overview in particular of the scope of the invoice fraud, the modus operandi of the suspects and the impact of the scams. Therefore, it may become a useful status report about this type of crime for the attention of judicial authorities as well.

3 Background

Intellectual property and Anti-Scam Network

IP refers to creations of the mind – everything from works of art to inventions, computer programs to trade marks and other commercial signs\(^2\).

It covers a vast range of activities and plays an important role in both cultural and economic life. Technological progress requires the development and application of new inventions, while a vibrant culture will constantly seek new ways to express itself. IP rights are also vital. Inventors, artists, scientists and Legal Business Structures put a lot of time, money, energy and thought into developing their innovations and creations. To encourage them to do that, they need the chance to make a fair return on their investment. That means giving them rights to protect their IP. Essentially, IPR such as design, patents and trade marks can be treated the same as any other property right. They allow the creators or owners of IP to benefit from their work or their investment in a creation by giving them control over how their property is used. This protection exists at national, European or international levels.

The IP protection process results in the public disclosure of information on the IPR. IP offices have registers where these data are stored and can be freely accessed by the public.

In 2019\(^3\), 22 million IPR were granted by national, European or international authorities, allowing many IPR owners’ personal data to be accessible by fraudsters. Applicants for IP protection come from all over the world, including for specific national protection.

Customers that have registered their IP with competent offices are contacted by criminals trying to defraud them at various points in the IP protection period.

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\(^2\) World Intellectual Property Organisation’s definition.

\(^3\) The 2020 figures had not yet been published at the time of writing.
(during the application process, after the registration and before the protection renewal processes). The fraudsters either impersonate the competent IP offices or adopt company names that are homonyms, or names that look or sound like legitimate, well-known offices, to deceive their victims. For example, by using a standard letter or, in a recent phenomenon, email resembling those of legitimate organisations, victims may be misled by a request for additional fees or the ‘offer’ of an unrequested service. This results in the distortion of the decision-making process of the individuals or Legal Business Structures targeted and impairs the victim’s ability to make an informed decision. This may lead them to enter a transaction that they would not have undertaken otherwise.

The distortion of the decision-making process is even stronger when fraudsters are using email addresses mimicking or typosquatting a genuine IP office’s email address. This new trend shows how agile and inventive the perpetrators are.

If the main motivation of fraudsters for sending misleading invoices or impersonating national or international offices is financial gain, data analysis would allow for the consideration of the following possibilities:

- Misuse of the identity of EUIPO or of another official IP office purely for profit-making purposes;
- Misuse of the identity of the EUIPO or another IP office in order to infringe on the IP protection (competition, economic espionage etc.) or harm a company;
- Misleading invoices related to an IP registration within a private register;
- Misleading invoices related to an IP watch service;
- Misleading invoices related to fake IP protection.

Based on the 2021 survey conducted by Europol on the legal definition of the scheme, and taking into consideration the Directive 2005/29/EC, criminal (swindle/fraud) and/or civil (misleading commercial practice) cases are built against the various modi operandi described in this report. However, the survey highlighted significant discrepancies in legal qualifications of these actions among MS.

To tackle this scheme, the EUIPO, National Intellectual Property Offices (NO), International Organisations administering IP rights (IO) and User Associations (UA) have declared their readiness to further step up their joint efforts in the pursuit of better and more efficient suppression of fraud with the creation of the Anti-Scam Network in 2015. Since then EUIPO, acting as the entrusted

Typosquatting is a form of cybercrime that involves fraudsters registering domains with the deliberately misspelled names of well-known websites’ domain names. For example, fraudsters could use an email address related to @euipos.europas.eu to try to pass as EUIPO, whose domain name is @euipo.europa.eu.

The survey conducted by Europol with all Member States and Third Parties was dedicated to retrieving legal assessment (civil or criminal) related to the various modi operandi seen in the scheme.

secretariat of the Network, has been sharing information related to the involved Legal Business Structures with Europol.

Who? Profiling the most active scammers

As the scheme utilises various modi operandi, it is difficult to draw a specific profile of the acting Legal Business Structures. Aside from the impersonation of genuine IP offices, the main actors involved in the scam are mainly Legal Business Structures posing as genuine and legitimate businesses offering services to IPR owners.

As in many scams, fraudsters hide behind company registration in several EU MS and beyond, providing strawmen data to hide the ultimate beneficial owner of the company.

Virtual seat facilities appear to be a phenomenon shared by the different actors to deceive LEA.

It is not uncommon to identify a rogue company linked with addresses that are different from the registration, the administrative address as mentioned on the invoices or the fiscal address as linked with the bank account. Also, to support their official standing, some Legal Business Structures mention addresses of the official seat linked to the country or even the cities of IP offices, which are mainly in Spain (EUIPO) or Switzerland (WIPO).

Over the years, however, a global correlation has been identified between the registration country and the bank account nationality which has led to the identification of three major clusters of Legal Business Structures involved in the scheme.

Aside from impersonating a genuine IP office, these Legal Business Structures deceive IPR owners by appearing official, mimicking the names and logos of IP offices and using recognisable symbols to elicit a positive response.

When it comes to logos, the trend of using a globe or a round image to generate the idea of a universal or worldwide company has been observed. According to the dictionary of symbols\(^7\), round forms are synonymous with knowledge and are associated with men, locations and places that celebrate or protect arts and sciences. The round images are symbols of unity and alliance. When associated with curved edges, the symbol shows movement and dynamism.

The use of stars might also be related to impersonating the EUIPO logo (the EUIPO logo contains stars).

According to the dictionary of symbols, the star is a very complex cultural form linked with various meanings such as vitality, energy, eternity or freedom. The star is also associated with guidance as it prevents sailors and wanderers from getting lost and brings them back to their loved ones. In this instance, the star is also associated with protection. By fighting darkness, it is also associated with truth and the link between God and humans.

The pentagram, a five branch star, is the most common representation of a star. In many cultures and religions, the pentagram symbolises the accomplished

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man, in his physical and spiritual nature. The five elements associated with the branches are earth, fire, water, air and the fifth element is the human spirit (at the top).

Most of the logos used by the fraudsters are blue, which is known to be the most appealing colour, probably because of marketing. Blue leads to feelings such as sympathy, trust and harmony. It also refers to the collective notion of appeasement. This reassuring hue is often favoured by Legal Business Structures or organisations that want to forge a link with the public.

In 2020 and 2021, a dozen Legal Business Structures were using a very similar logo made with yellow stars and blue lines, very similar to the EUIPO, WIPO or the European Consumer Centre Network logo.

Below are some examples of logos used by Legal Business Structures involved in the misleading invoice scam⁸:

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When it comes to names and/or brands, the words ‘Intellectual Property’ are mainly used as in any IP office, as are the terms institute, register, registry, office, service or agency. The idea is likely to get an official-sounding brand or acronym that will sound familiar to the IPR owners.

The EUIPO dedicated webpage\(^9\) provides a list of Legal Business Structures considered active in the misleading invoices scam, such as:

- EAIP - European Agency Intellectual Property
- EIP - European Intellectual Property Institute
- EIPA - European Intellectual Property Agency
- EOIP - European Organization Intellectual Property
- EPT Agency - European Patent & Trade mark Agency
- European IP Register
- GOIP – Intellectual Property
- IOIP - International Organisation Intellectual Property
- IPIO - Organization Intellectual Property
- IPOE - Intellectual Property Office Europe
- IPRO - Intellectual Property Registration Office
- IPRB - IP Register BENELUX - Intellectual Property Service
- IPTR - International Patent and Trade mark Register
- TM World - International Registration of Trade marks
- WOIP - World Organization Intellectual Property
- WPTA - World patent & Trade mark Agency
- WPTD - World Patent & Trade mark Database
- WTP - World Trade mark Publication
- WTPR - Trade marks & Patent Register
- WWT – Worldwide Trade marks

To complete the scam, the rogue Legal Business Structures have to rely on multiple stakeholders i.e. the bank, mailing and printing Legal Business Structures, web design Legal Business Structures, software solutions creators etc. However, based on Europol analysis, several actors took shares in Legal Business Structures involved in these supporting activities.

Europol statistics indicate that Hungary, Poland and Spain were found to be the main countries where bank accounts related to fake invoice scams were opened. However, the rise of non-European banks may indicate the fraudsters’ preference to avoid European banks which may be seen to be more likely to cooperate in a European Union framework.

Due to the COVID-19 situation, banks had to adapt to continue offering services to their new and existing customers. This led to the development of online registration for bank accounts, which may have aided the fraudsters.

The use of online banks or payment service providers is also considered a new vulnerability and is monitored accordingly.

Based on Europol’s analysis, millions of unsolicited and misleading invoices are sent yearly. Such volume would require professional infrastructure and may involve the service of printing and postal service Legal Business Structures. The latter are necessary for mass-mailing fraud. The misleading invoice scheme related to IPR owners showed that Dutch mailing Legal Business Structures and German post offices were mainly used by the fraudsters.

How? Usual behavioural patterns of scammers

The scammers target the IPR owners during the entire IP protection process but four main modi operandi have been identified so far:

- Targeting the IPR applicant between the publication of the IP applied for and before the end of the opposition period (the fraudsters are impersonating genuine IP offices) – MO 01 (the following examples are extracted from EUIPO’s webpage dedicated to misleading invoices);

- Targeting the IPR owner in a short period just after the publication of the registered IP to lure them into an unrequested service or additional private registration – MO 02 (the following examples are extracted from EUIPO’s webpage dedicated to misleading invoices).
- Targeting the IPR owner several months after the publication of the registered IP for additional fees by impersonating IP offices or by luring them into unrequested service or additional private registration – MO 03 (the following example is extracted from EUIPO’s webpage dedicated to misleading invoices12);

- Targeting the IPR owner several months or, on some occasions, years before the start of the official IPR renewal process to propose a renewal application via a third party (a more expensive and sometimes not effective contract) – MO 04 (the following examples are extracted from EUIPO’s webpage dedicated to misleading invoices13).

These four modi operandi rely on various tricks and biases so the IPR owner will react positively.

Applying for IP registration is a multiphased and important process during which applicants, and in particular direct filers acting without a representative, may experience fear of not being able to protect their IP. Therefore, there are significant consequences when fraudsters interfere with the application or renewal process and send fake invoices or payment requests relating to the registration or renewal of the IPR to the applicants or rights owners by impersonating the IP office. This leads to the IPR applicant or owner, who was expecting a positive answer from the IP office, becoming keener to pay the fees and being less proactive in identifying that the received document was fake.

The fraudsters are mainly targeting the IPR applicant in the short period just after the publication of the IP applied for, when the victim is still in the IP
registration process (MO 01). They will emphasise the urgency of the payment (between 7 or 14 days) to pressure the victim and create fear of not protecting the IP if the payment is not made. The use of bold or red font attached to words used to show urgency or importance pressures the victim and creates a bias in their will. Also the use of sentences including the form ‘Please + verb’ is an instructional or imperative way of writing, meaning that the fraudsters tell people what to do and try and hide the instruction by using the word ‘please’. The chosen words and the way the sentences are written have an impact on the reader’s perception. This is linked to the linguistic bias in our unconscious when we perceive information.

This bias is optimised by the layout of a look-alike invoice template used by the fraudsters, which goes beyond the simple use of a brand name that sounds official.

Even if there is no specific layout for a uniform invoice, a genuine online invoice generator lists compulsory information under the respective national law. Some elements can be considered indicative of an invoice:

- The date of the invoice (date on which the invoice is issued),
- Invoice number (a unique number for each invoice and based on a chronological and continuous sequence, without ‘holes’, an invoice cannot be deleted. The numbering can be done by distinct series (for example with a prefix per year) if the conditions of the exercise justify it),
- The identity of the seller or service provider (company name, address of the registered office, invoicing address if different),
- The identity of the buyer or customer (company name, address of the customer, invoicing address if different and delivery address),
- Designation and statement of products and services rendered (nature, brand, product references, materials supplied and delivered services),
- Quantity, rate and total amount to be paid excluding tax (excluding VAT) and all taxes (including VAT), discounts and other possible rebates,
- The date or deadline for payment,
- Where applicable, bank details or additional elements, such as terms and conditions.

If the document received by the IP applicant or owner follows the basic and universally known invoice layout, there is a well-founded suspicion that the sender is trying to mislead the victim by using these elements. The outcome might be different if the Legal Business Structures receive a simple letter merely proposing or offering a service.

Shipping methods used

The shipping method depends on the modi operandi. Several Legal Business Structures are sending misleading invoices in regularly stamped envelopes whereas others are using the service of a mailing company or services present in the various EU MS such as in Germany and the Netherlands.

While the use of a contractual shipping company might be useful for investigators to identify the supply chain, the use of regular mailboxes and post offices leads to more difficult work for the LEA as it is not always possible to identify the specific origin of the letter based on the postage stamp.
Pricing schemes

The scam relies on the openly accessible registration data provided by the IP offices, as required by law. Therefore, depending on the modi operandi and the targeted IP rights, the fraudsters, as any official national or international IP office, adapt their fees to the protected IP (trade mark, design or patent) and the number of classes in which the IP has to be protected.

While the official basic application fee for an individual EU trademark by electronic means is €850\(^{14}\) at EUIPO, the average fraudulent fees, requested by fraudsters, are twice or three times as expensive as the genuine EUIPO fees. In 2021, the average fraudulent fee for private registration of an IP, for one class, was €2 000.

Amounts greater than €2 000 are not uncommon in this type of fraud and have been noted in previous years but in lower volume. However, no fees above €10 000 have been observed since 2015 when 1% of the invoices included such an amount.

Combination of illicit/fictitious services with real IP services

The difference in modi operandi leads to varied analysis when it comes to the reality of service based on fees.

In the modi operandi of impersonating a regional, national or international IP office, fraudsters will request either additional fees to complete the registration or propose a renewal of registration but no service is actually fulfilled. They only take advantage of the misleading invoice to divert the IPR owners’ money.

When a company is acting as a hub or a proxy in the IP renewal process, the analysis showed that in 40% of all cases the company actually renewed the IP registration with the competent IP office.

When the fraudulent Legal Business Structures offered their services for private registration, first checks showed that the latter hold actual databases full of IPR owners’ data, which could potentially indicate that the service offer may be genuine. However, investigations didn’t show if the database was related to actual contracts between the IPR owners and the fraudulent company. As the IPR register data is publicly accessible, it would be easy for the fraudsters to take over the entire database, or a large part of it.

When the fraudulent Legal Business Structures are offering a monitoring service, the first investigations demonstrated that no actual service was provided to the IPR owners.

Moreover, it is likely that there is a cross-cutting fraud scheme based on the publication of the trademark by EUIPO and WIPO.

For example, domain name cybersquatting\(^ {15}\) has been identified as a second level threat impacting the IP owners who then have to battle to be able to register a domain name with a desired top-level domain extension. In some

\(^{14}\) Plus €50 for a second class of goods and services and, plus €150 for each class of goods and services exceeding two for an individual EU trade mark.

\(^{15}\) Cybersquatting is the practice of registering names, especially well-known company or brand names, as internet domains in the hope of reselling them at a profit.
cases, when the domain name and its extension have already been registered by fraudsters who are taking advantage of the public publication of the IP related data, the IP owners have the option to launch a Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy (UDRP)\(^\text{16}\) procedure or to buy back the domain name from the fraudsters.

**To whom? Profiles of the scam targets and victims**

As acquisition fraud is targeting IPR owners either at a regional, national or international level, there is no specific profile of the target, nor any mention of any specific country affected more than another for any reason other than the number of IPR owners from this country. As is visible in the EUIPO Statistics for European Union Trade Marks evolution report, Germany has a leading position in registering IP and therefore German Legal Business Structures/nationals were the most targeted\(^\text{17}\).

However, Europol identified fraudsters’ Legal Business Structures targeting specific countries (e.g. Switzerland) or expanding their scheme after having targeted one country (for example, the EUIPO and WIPO misleading scam on renewal fees was only targeting German IPR owners in early 2020, but the scheme had expanded to other European countries e.g. Austria, France and Italy).

Due to the lack of recent official statistics, the number of successful fraudulent scams is hard to establish. In one of its articles published in 2018\(^\text{18}\), the World Trademark Review website stated that the conversion rate (i.e. the percentage of Legal Business Structures who actually paid the invoices) for an IP mailing scam was 8%.

There is currently a survey under review amongst the Anti-Scam Network to be sent to all IPR owners to gather information. This survey aims to identify potential weak spots and ‘vulnerabilities’, e.g. common characteristics of scam victims (such as external or in-house pre-authorised accountants, secretaries, paralegals, CFOs, etc.) and common behaviour that led to payment (i.e. shortcomings in or non-compliance with internal workflows, lack of consultation with the legal department of the company or with an external lawyer, ‘blind’ payments, etc.).

For the IPR owners, public authorities and economic operators, to be able to exercise the rights conferred on them and be informed about the existence of prior rights belonging to third parties, all data published in the register, including personal data, concerning the EU trade mark applications and registrations are considered to be of public interest\(^\text{19}\). This ‘by-design’ transparency has, however, the consequence that freely accessible data may be used by fraudsters to target their victims.

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\(^{16}\) The Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy (UDRP) is a process established by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) for the resolution of disputes regarding the registration of internet domain names.


There are some cases that suggest that IPR owners do not always expect that their data is publicly available by law and are lured by Legal Business Structures providing them with accurate information related to their IP protection process.

The urgency to pay the fees also triggers the targeted IPR owner with a short timeframe to act. Sometimes this timeframe is even shortened by a voluntary delay in the sending process so the target will receive the letter when the deadline is no longer 8 days, but 2 or 3 days instead, based on postal delay or invoice date.

Furthermore, the renewal of a registered IPR takes place ten years after (for trademarks) or five years after (for designs) its first registration and then is repeated at the same intervals. Legal Business Structures may not recall the exact name of the competent IP office with which they are registered, so variations may look legitimate to them.

In addition, many Legal Business Structures have a policy of not systematically checking the authenticity of invoices below a certain threshold. Indeed, the number of transactions they handle makes it more cost-efficient to assume the risk than to employ a thorough checks policy that may require significant investment in time and resources.

4 Scamming impact

According to WIPO statistics, 22 million IPR were granted by regional, national or international IP offices (industrial design, patent, trade mark and utility model) around the world in 2019.

However, based on Europol’s assessment, it seems that a lower figure has to be taken into account in the misleading invoice scheme, as the fraudsters seem to be focusing their efforts on IP offices that maintain registers of larger territorial scope. The scheme mostly targets trademark owners but design and patent holders also receive a share of it.

Taking into account the number of average yearly applications with EUIPO and WIPO, Europol considers that at least around 400 000 publications a year are being targeted by fraudsters. Therefore, small amounts of individual invoices received per country have to be looked upon on a larger international scale, as they could represent only a small part of a more global scheme.

In 2020, Europol received approximately nine hundred examples of misleading or fake invoices. Regular discussions with representatives of IP law firms confirm that many of the misleading invoices are detected as part of a scam and are thrown away by the IPR applicants, without any reporting to law enforcement or the Anti-Scam Network. However, due to the lack of reporting, measuring the current number of misleading invoices actually paid by the IPR applicants is still

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22 EUIPO published approximately 220 000 trade marks and 100 000 designs in 2020; WIPO and its Madrid system published around 64 000 trade marks in 2020.
very challenging. In one of its articles published in 2018\textsuperscript{23} related to a 2016 New Zealand survey, the World Trademark Review stated that the conversion rate (i.e. the percentage of Legal Business Structures who actually paid the invoices) for an IP mailing scam was 8%.

With an average invoice fee of €2 000, the yearly net turnover made by one actor sending misleading invoices can be assessed as up to €64 million, using the 2016 conversion rate suggested in the above-mentioned article.

As Europol has been able to identify forty different Legal Business Structures involved in the misleading invoice scheme in 2020-2021, based on the above assumption the yearly loss to the targeted applicants could reach €2.56 billion.

According to several analysts\textsuperscript{24}, fraud ranging from €10 000 to €100 000 has a direct impact on the finances of 56% of Small and Medium Enterprises which could even lead to insolvency.

Based on the fact that several targeted Legal Business Structures have stated that they have received several different misleading invoices, it is very likely that the scheme has an actual negative economic impact on Legal Business Structures.

Although money plays a very important part in the scheme, it is not the only aspect to consider. The reputational damage this crime may cause to IP offices has to be taken into consideration. Several IP owners are still wondering why their personal data are available to the public despite the rules of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), although the IP offices merely comply with their legal obligation when they make personal data entered in the register accessible to the public. Some victims, who did not notice that the invoices were not sent by EUIPO, complained to EUIPO regarding fees that they considered were hidden in the IP protection process. This may damage IP owners’ trust and lead them to reconsider their future relationship with the official IP agencies. It may also discourage them from protecting their IPR or lead them to enter into contracts with unofficial agencies which cannot legally grant IPR.

5 Anti-scam problems & vulnerabilities

Despite warnings published on the official websites of the members of the Anti-Scam Network, the number of reports received by EUIPO appear to be only a fraction of the total quantity. It appears that only those Legal Business Structures which successfully identified the scam and were willing to collaborate ultimately shared their concerns with the relevant stakeholders.


\textsuperscript{24} Fraud survey 2019 by DFCG (French association of finance directors and controllers) partner of Euler Hermes council.
In light of this, the two main obstacles are the ability to identify the scam and then report it, or share it with the relevant stakeholders.

Also, as mentioned previously, the overall damage caused by fake invoice fraud is difficult to determine in precise numbers, since many Legal Business Structures unknowingly pay fake invoices, or do not want to make it publicly known or report that they were defrauded. In addition, many Legal Business Structures adopt a policy of not checking the authenticity of invoices below a certain threshold. These Legal Business Structures are prepared to take the risk of paying invoices that may turn out to be fake, rather than incurring the cost of extensive invoice controls.

Another important vulnerability relies on the legal obligation that ties the IP offices to make the details of their relationships with their customers publicly available. The online availability of customer data on IPR applied for and registered, the names and addresses of owners and representatives, and the expiration date of the registration, creates a substantial vulnerability that is used by the fraudsters to retrieve useful data for their scam.

Criminals specialised in invoice fraud exploit these vulnerabilities and are able to gain profits from this criminal business.

When they receive the invoice, how do they react? Do they report it? To whom?

Based on discussions with several law firms’ representatives, most of the Legal Business Structures that spotted the scam did not pay the fees and threw away the misleading invoice, with or without reporting it to EUIPO and the Anti-Scam Network. However, the exchange of communication between IPR owners and EUIPO (or the Anti-Scam Network member) mainly relies on the request for confirmation of the ‘received invoice from EUIPO’ showing that neither the IPR owner nor their IP counsellor clearly spotted the scam.

IP owners’ interviews also showed that several actually spotted that the document was not sent from official agencies offering private registration or IP monitoring. In that case, they were willing to pay the requested fees to add additional protection to their IP. After being informed of the scam, (no actual IP monitoring or registration renewal was performed by the rogue company or the registration into a private register was irrelevant) many Legal Business Structures filed a complaint to their local LEA. However, some Legal Business Structures simply decided not to bother the LEA with a complaint, having little faith in stopping the scheme or simply blaming bad luck for being caught in a scam.

Reporting the scam doesn’t seem easy to the IPR owners in the EU especially when the scam is based on a proposal of service. Police agencies might be reluctant to consider these facts as criminal, whereas it remains a question if the IPR owner may be considered as a consumer, thereby relying on consumer protection and able to share the information with consumer protection agencies.

For example, in France, the General Directorate for Competition Policy, Consumer Affairs and Fraud Control and its various Departmental Directorates for the Protection of Populations receive complaints from business owners and
share awareness material and good practices related to misleading invoice schemes.

When they pay, do they claim their money back (from the scammer or the bank)? Why not?

When they become aware of the scam, the IPR owners either try to contact the sender company itself to terminate the contract (and in some cases pay the illegitimate 10% termination fees) or ask their bank to freeze the wire transfer of money, informing them of the scam. In some cases, most likely because they are aware of the scam or are suspicious about the abnormal financial activity, several banks decide to stop the money transfer and/or re-credit it after the destination bank account has been blocked or closed.

By mid-2021, Europol started witnessing new features in the fine print of misleading invoices that could be assessed as counter-measures by the fraudsters. They clearly mention that any attempt by the victims to contact their bank will not be processed and/or will be refused by the bank as it cannot refund any payments without the approval of the company (i.e. the fraudsters). Of course, this has no legal value but it might discourage victims from claiming their money back.

In other cases, some victims contacted the fraudsters and asked for the termination or cancellation of the signed contract. The fraudsters agreed but claimed that, as mentioned in the contract, a 10% penalty would have to be paid to proceed with the request.

The major stakeholders in the fight against scams

Who is acting now?

Since 2015, EUIPO, regional and national IP offices, international organisations and several Users Associations have declared their readiness to voluntarily cooperate by participating in a dedicated Anti-Scam Network. First through the Spanish authorities, then directly with Europol thanks to a Service Level Agreement, EUIPO has shared information and data related to the misleading invoice scam from all around the world which was collected through the Anti-Scam Network.

The data is collected, processed, analysed and disseminated to the competent national authorities under Europol’s mandate.

LEA agencies are engaged in the fight against the scheme if complaints are filed. However, the lack of a centralised reporting platform appears to be an obstacle in dealing with the scheme at a national level and makes it difficult to prioritise this threat.

Currently, EUIPO, WIPO, some national IP offices such as the Czech agency and User Associations such as MARQUES contribute considerably to the fight against the scheme, by publishing awareness webpages and/or holding webinars.
For example, the EUIPO’s website provides guidance, awareness materials and a continuously updated searchable collection of misleading invoices\textsuperscript{25}.

The United States Patent and Trade mark Office, Federal Trade Commission and Law Enforcement Agencies such as the USPIS are very engaged in tackling the scheme as well. In 2021, the US authorities caught two main actors involved in an IP protection renewal scam.

**Who is not acting now (but could/should act)?**

When addressing the question of who is not acting, IPR owners are top of the list. As in many scams, victims do not always report the crime. According to the Scamadviser 2020 report, only 7% of all cases related to online scams are reported. Based on the above-mentioned figures, misled victims are reporting even less to the Anti-Scam Network or to Law Enforcement. This non-action can sometimes be a result of IP owners considering that reporting is either a waste of time or simply not operative.

IP specialised law firms, lawyers’ organisations and user associations could be more active in the fight against this phenomenon. Prevention and awareness material could be easily uploaded to their websites.

Considering the possible cross-cutting factor of this scheme (similar to the registry scams of fake Legal Business Structures or domain name squatting scams), additional stakeholders could be involved, such as the consumer protection associations and authorities (at national and European level), and especially the European Consumer Centre Network as their logo is inspiring at least a dozen rogue actors involved in the scheme. Also, this network is hosting the website www.europe-consommateurs.eu, on which awareness material on fake professional registers can be found.

Banking associations, especially in the online bank community, could also be more proactive in the KYC process and raise awareness amongst their customers who are likely to be targeted by scammers.

**What are the needs for improving ongoing collaboration and potential synergies?**

Improving ongoing collaboration is always a need and a goal.

To do so, enlarging the Anti-Scam Network to include new members/observers such as other organisations engaged in fighting scams or creating subgroups within the Anti-Scam Network dedicated to specific aspects could be considered.

**Problems and deficiencies/areas for improvement:**

The following problems and deficiencies could be improved in several ways (non-exhaustive list):

- Raising awareness of, and providing training for, the IPR owners and representatives and banking associations,
- Technically preventing fraudsters from retrieving actionable data easily,
- Developing information sharing among stakeholders,
- Identifying key LEA actors in each MS who will consider the scheme a priority,
- Coordinating investigation at a European level,
- Providing precedent cases and arguments to the competent authorities demonstrating that the scheme is criminal fraud,
- Involving consumer protection agencies to leverage investigations where applicable,
- Recognising business identity theft as a criminal offence in all European countries.

What are the obstacles faced by stakeholders?

When there is a lack of reporting and prioritisation by LEA, users, lawyers and members of the banking community will experience a deficit of awareness material and training.

Reporting initiatives, either governmental, private or within a public-private partnership, are not allowed to share their data due to the lack of official cooperation mandate but also due to restrictions provided for in the privacy legislation (i.e. GDPR).

As for IP offices, the limits of the national legal framework for the recognition of their locus standi in criminal proceedings and the lack of criminal assessment by LEA might be one of the top obstacles to overcome.

The way forward

Several Member States\(^{26}\) have developed web platforms where victims can directly report or fill in a complaint related to a scam. However, some platforms such as the French initiative ‘Thésée’\(^{27}\) are mainly looking at online fraud which is not the case for the current scam. There is a need therefore for the centralisation of information in each MS in order to provide a better understanding of the phenomenon.

The following investigations have been successful in the past:

• 2011 Belgian case (Open Source information)

On 29 April 2020, the Brussels Criminal Court convicted a Finnish citizen to four years of imprisonment for being part of a large European scam network involved in sending misleading invoices concerning trade mark renewals.

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\(^{27}\) Légifrance, Arrêté du 26 juin 2020 portant création d’un traitement automatisé de données à caractère personnel dénommé « traitement harmonisé des enquêtes et des signalements pour les e-escroqueries » (THESEE), 1 July 2020, https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/loda/id/JORFTEXT0000042056637/
Back in 2011, the Benelux Association for Trade Mark and Design Law (BMM) was informed that trade mark owners had received invoices from fictitious Legal Business Structures with a Belgian address and a German PO box number. The invoices reported to the trade mark owners that their trade mark was on the verge of expiring and that these had to be renewed. The company logos of ECTO S.A. and EPTO S.A. that were used on these invoices were more or less similar to the logo of EUIPO which falsely gave the impression to the trade mark owner that it concerned an official European organisation. For the renewal of one trade mark, ECTO and EPTO charged fees of up to €3 750.

The payments for renewals were to be made to a Belgian bank account. The amounts were subsequently transferred to bank accounts in Denmark and Switzerland and even a bank account in Hong Kong. Based on the criminal file, it was established that the criminal network involved in the scam generated a turnover of over €1 million between 2010 and 2014 (the date of the confirmation of the complaint). The investigations conducted by the bank also showed that the criminal practices were maintained for years, utilising several consecutive Legal Business Structures, names and logos, but always using the same method of operation.

• 2017 Swedish case (Open Source information)

In a ruling of 20 December, 2017, the Court of Appeal in Stockholm (Svea Hovrätt) sentenced twenty people for fraud for sending false invoices concerning EU trade marks. The invoices appeared to be from the EU Intellectual Property Agency, Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (OHIM - now EUIPO), and were sent to several hundred people in a number of countries. All recipients had previously applied to OHIM for EU trade marks.

The main suspect was convicted of gross fraud in 355 individual cases and received a penalty of 4 years and 8 months in jail. Another suspect was convicted of assistance in gross fraud and sentenced to jail for 2 years and 9 months.

18 other people were also charged with gross fraud and assistance in gross fraud, as these persons had allowed their bank accounts to be used in the fraud activities and, in some cases, also sent the fraudulent invoices. Two of these people were sentenced to prison.

The length of the prison sentences is high in the scale for gross fraud, justified by the Court of Appeal, due to the aggravating circumstances, the large extent of the fraud, the organized approach and the fact that the invoices appeared to be from OHIM/EUIPO.

The IP offices may also consider filing a complaint that an attempt was made to steal their identity or to damage their reputation through the use of a mimicked name by the fraudsters.
Where applicable, a Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy (UDRP)\(^\text{28}\) could be initiated by national, regional or international IP agencies regarding domain names used by the fraudulent Legal Business Structures to be able to block the online aspect of the scam.

With a complaint about misuse of personal data, victims could express a violation of their rights when the fraudulent Legal Business Structures retrieve data from the IP office’s dataset and contact the customers without their consent.

Once investigations are launched, a ‘follow-the-money’ approach should be considered. LEA can rely on a strong and very effective Financial Intelligence Unit Network, which enables smooth cooperation.

Based on Article 2 of the Directive (EU) 2020/1828\(^\text{29}\), representative action for the protection of the collective interests of the victims of misleading fraud isn’t possible as IPR owners are not considered consumers per se and the legal action should not be used for professional purposes. No global action by any user association could therefore be launched using the new protocol and procedure.

Finally, due to the EU-wide and worldwide aspect of the scheme, international cooperation mechanisms should be used as soon as possible. Europol and its European Financial and Economic Crime Centre are especially dedicated to this scheme and should be approached from the beginning of the investigation to provide support and guidance.

### 6 Recommended anti-scam strategy

**Strategic guidance for the major stakeholders in the fight against scams, including concrete recommended actions**

**Legislators (EU & MS levels)**

- Consider creating a criminal offence for business identity theft so IP offices will be able to file a criminal complaint against such impersonation.

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\(^{28}\) The Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy is a process established by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers for the resolution of disputes regarding the registration of internet domain names.

- Similar to Directive (EU) 2020/1828 on representative actions for the protection of the collective interests of consumers\(^{30}\), propose a legal framework for representative actions by IPR owners associations.
- Assess the possibility of harmonising legislation on fraud, taking into consideration the phenomenon of misleading invoices (mass invoice fraud).

**IP offices (EU & MS levels)**

- Consider internal policies regarding the accessibility/timely availability of contact data linked with IP, in line with the legal framework applicable to the IP Office.
- Conduct a survey dedicated to assessing the global scope of the invoices received, their payment and the actual existence of any of the services offered by the senders of misleading invoices.
- Systematically file a complaint whenever EUIPO, WIPO or any national IP office is impersonated in a fraud scheme.
- Consider sharing knowledge of the Anti-Scam Network with other networks or agencies due to the ongoing commercial registration fraud scheme.
- Develop an awareness campaign and update the existing training and webinars.
- Whenever appropriate, initiate procedures with domain name registrars, authoritative registries or engage in UDRP procedures against fraudsters’ Legal Business Structures.

**Law Enforcement Authorities**

- Encourage Police units to launch investigation in the area of misleading invoice fraud.
- Strengthen international police cooperation in the area of misleading invoice fraud.
- Support national awareness, in particular using EUIPO and Europol-based material.
- Expand awareness to the Chambers of Commerce and Trade Registry based on aspects of cross-cutting criminality.

**Business/User Associations/lawyers/professional representatives**

- Improve knowledge transfer within the Anti-Scam Network.
- Develop an awareness campaign on this topic.

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Banks/Anti-money laundering regulated institutions

- Raise internal awareness in the use of misleading name in the bank account opening process.
- Consider participation within the Anti-Scam network as observers.
- Develop an awareness campaign on this topic.
Annex 1: List of abbreviations

ECC-Net: European Consumer Centre Network
EUIPO: European Union Intellectual Property Office
GDPR: General Data Protection Regulation
IOs: International Organisations administering Intellectual Property Rights
IP: Intellectual Property
IPR: Intellectual Property Rights
IPR owner: unless otherwise indicated in the document, this term covers both applicants and owners
KYC: Know Your Customer
NOs: National Intellectual Property Offices
OHIM: Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market
SMEs: Small and Medium Enterprises
UAs: User Associations
UDRP: Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy
WIPO: World Intellectual Property Organization